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What Makes "Model" Sexual Offenses?
A Canadian Perspective
Christine Boyle*
It is as true as the proposition in Euclid, that the criminal
law of Canada is above that of any nation or State on the
face of the earth.1
No treatise (for that is what the Code is) has so advanced
thought about its subject, not even Wigmore's. The
reporters and their associates have restored intellectual
respectability to the substantive criminal law, in general
and in detail.2
What does it mean to "model" sexual offenses? A
Canadian perspective may be of some interest to those
considering reform of this area of law since, during the last
two decades of the twentieth century, Canadians have seen
a dramatic flurry of both judicial and legislative activity
relating to all aspects of the criminal law of sexual assault:
substantive, procedural, evidentiary, and sentencing.' The
political context for debate over these issues is one in which
there are strongly-held views about law and order, gender
and intersecting forms of inequality, the appropriate
criminalization of behaviors primarily committed by
members of more privileged groups against members of
* Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia.
1. Don Stuart, Canadian Criminal Law: A Treatise 2 (3d ed. 1995) (quoting
J.C. Hopkins, Life and Work of Sir John Thompson (1985)).
2. Herbert L. Packer, The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 63 Colum. L. Rev.
594(1963).
3. What were formerly the offenses of rape and indecent assault were
transformed into a range of sexual assault offenses in 1983. See The Criminal
Code Amendment Act, ch. 125 1980-81-82-83 S.C. 3649 [Statutes of Canada]
(Can.). For the current law, see the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, ch. C-46 (1985),
amended by An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (sexual assault), ch. 38, 1992
S.C. 991. References to sexual assault in Canadian law, therefore, include rape
as defined in the Model Penal Code and Commentaries (Official Draft and
Revised Comments 1980).
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more disadvantaged groups, the role of judicial discretion,
and indeed the social value of punishment. While the
writer does not, of course, seriously mean to suggest that
Canadian laws provide a model for the United States,
Canadian efforts at law reform may be helpful in a
discussion of how the Model Penal Code (M.P.C.) should
address sexual violence.
However, a basic question is whether the concept of
"model" offenses is one that withstands scrutiny at all, any
more than a claim to superiority for Canadian criminal
law. When I started to think about this paper I thought of
discussing criteria for modelness and applying them to
some sample issues. I set out to identify such criteria. I
was confident that model sexual offenses would of course
have to reflect consistency with constitutional norms. Less
confidently I thought that it would be worth exploring what
would make a model orientation to law reform in this field
and what would promote the legitimacy of new model
offenses. There are some obvious ideals for codification,
such as consistency and clarity. One could turn as well for
guidance to the framers of the M.P.C. itself, who, for
example, sought criteria for legitimacy in criticisms of the
existing law. The M.P.C. was thus to be effective,
practicable, humane, and scientific, and consistent with
"[c]ivilized social thought," which regarded penal law as the
ultimate weapon.4 It would claim the virtue of rationality.5
4. See Herbert Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 Harv. L.
Rev. 1097, 1105-06 (1952).
5. For instance, the Introductory Note to section 213 states that:
With respect to the crime of rape itself, the Model Code seeks to introduce a
rational grading scheme by dividing the offenses into three felony levels,
reserving the most serious category for those instances of aggression
resulting in serious bodily injury or for certain cases of imposition where
there is no voluntary social and sexual relationship between the parties.
Model Penal Code art. 213 introductory note (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1980) (emphasis added). In my view this is a good example of the
danger of hubris in asserting the virtue of rationality for one's own opinions. Why
would it be rational to see raping a woman one knows as less serious than raping
a stranger? Why would another view that the two rapes are equally serious or
indeed that the breach of trust makes raping a person one knows more serious be
irrational? For instance, sections 718.2(a) (ii) and (iii) of the Act to Amend the
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To some extent its very modelness would lie in the fact that
it was a code, rather than mere law reform proposals.6
Wechsler, however, recognized the fact that there are
varying political views and social conditions as a difficulty.7
Having struggled unsuccessfully to find criteria which I
could use to argue that my ideas for sexual offenses are
more model than those in the M.P.C., I find this difficulty
to be, not completely, but largely, insurmountable.
Of course, the best candidate for a standard of
modelness is consistency with constitutional norms,
accompanied by broader "legality" concerns, having to do,
for instance, with fair notice. It is here that I may be able
to come closest to my original objective.
In both Canada and the United States, there are
clusters of rights which provide the constitutional backdrop
for any statement of criminal law. In general terms, these
rights have to do with constraints on the way legislators
can frame the law. For instance, offenses must be drafted
with sufficient clarity, and must be consistent with the
right to equality. Thus, I think that "children should be
seen and not heard" would be an unconstitutional offense
in both jurisdictions. Constitutional rights also create
constraints on the way the courts can try accused persons.
For instance, trial processes must be both fair and
egalitarian. Thus, I think that an assumption that women
are less credible witnesses than men would contribute to
Criminal Code list as aggravating factors in sentencing that the offender abused
his spouse or child and that he abused a position of trust in relation to the victim.
A further example lies in the M.P.C.'s focus on objective manifestations of
aggression by the accused. See Model Penal Code § 213.1 (Official Draft and
Revised Comments 1980). Why would it be rational to treat as non-criminal non-
violent but nevertheless non-consensual behavior? Is it not just as rational to
criminalize non-consensual sexual contact and view silence as non-consent? The
view that rape of a voluntary social companion is less serious was based on the
argument that the presence of this factor reduces confidence in the conclusion of
aggression and is relevant to the degree of injury inflicted. See id. Thus a class of
people, essentially women who socialize or have sex with men are treated as less
credible and less injured. But wherein Hes the claim to rationality in the
proposition that men are less likely to rape the women they know?
6. Wechsler, supra note 4, at 1131.
7. Id. at 1132.
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both an unfair and an inegalitarian trial.8
The first step in any modeling of sexual offenses
should therefore be the identification of all relevant
constitutional rights. A significant one in Canada is that
offenses must not punish the morally innocent. However,
here I want to focus on a norm which may not be so
obvious. The Canadian version of the Fourteenth
Amendment can be found in section 15(1) of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which states:
Every individual is equal before and under the law and has
the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law
without discrimination and, in particular, without
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin,
colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.'
I have argued that, in Canada, equality rights tend to
be neglected at this stage of identification of relevant
rights, and so fear that neglect in the framing of new
offenses in the United States also. There is not such a
pervasive understanding that laws relating to sexual
violence must be egalitarian as there is, for instance, that
they must be clear and fair to accused persons. For several
decades now in both jurisdictions, criminal law in general
and the law relating to sexual violence in particular has
been subject to criticism for reflecting a pervasive distrust
of women and children, and for facilitating male sexual
access to them irrespective of their wishes. Such criticism
focused on both substantive and procedural/evidentiary
law. For instance, the attention drawn to the limitations of
our pivotal concept of consent reflected findings to the
effect that "no" can mean "maybe."10  Particular criticism
8. See generally John Henry Wigmore, The Science of Judicial Proof as Given
by Logic, Psychology, and General Experience, and Illustrated in Judicial Trials
334 (3d ed. 1937) (discussing ideas about credibility).
9. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, R.S.C. being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.) c.11, § 15(1) (1985)
(Can.).
10. See The Queen v. Letendre (1991) 5 C.R. (4th) 159 (B.C.S.C.) [Canada:
Criminal Reports].
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was directed at the "defense" of mistaken belief in consent,
which, in Canada, used to permit those wishing to have
sexual contact with others to act on subjective and self-
interested misconceptions about the wishes of others and
indeed, even allowed them to substitute their own
normative views of when sexual contact is permissible for
legal norms. Further criticisms were directed at the high
level of sexual assault complaints deemed "unfounded" by
police, evidence rules codifying differential treatment of
complainants, such as the rules about corroboration, recent
complaint and sexual history, and discriminatory
generalizations about relative credibility which influenced
fact determination in this field." While there are some
differences in legal doctrine, such concerns would be
familiar to drafters of any new model offenses in the United
States.
Since the equality guarantees of the Charter came into
force in 1985, much critical analysis of the law has tended
to focus on how it falls short of offering women and children
the equal protection and benefit of the law, as well as on its
lack of attention to the targeting of sexual assault of people
who experience intersecting inequalities, such as people
with disabilities and Aboriginal women.
The Canadian Parliament has, in recent years,
consistently tried to model attention to equality as well as
other constitutional values in criminal law reform. For
instance, the Preamble to the most recent reform of the
substantive and evidentiary laws relating to sexual assault
states:
Whereas the Parliament of Canada is gravely concerned
about the incidence of sexual violence and abuse in
Canadian society and, in particular, the prevalence of
11. See generally Christine Boyle & Marilyn MacCrimmon, The
Constitutionality of Bill C-49: Analysing Sexual Assault Law as If Equality Really
Mattered, 41 Crim. L.Q. 198 (1998).
12. For an overview see, Jennifer Scott & Sheila McIntyre, Women's Legal
Education and Action Fund (LEAF): Submissions to Standing Committee on
Justice and Legal Affairs: Review of Bill C-46 [An Act to amend the Criminal
Code (production of records in sexual offence proceedings)] (1997).
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sexual assault against women and children;...
Whereas the Parliament of Canada intends to promote and
help to ensure the full protection of the rights guaranteed
under sections 7 [fundamental justice] and 15 [equality] of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; ......
This makes clear that Parliament was attempting to
promote and protect a number of constitutional values,
primarily the cluster of rights which together make up the
accused's right to a fair trial, including the right to full
answer and defense, and the right to equality of those
groups most affected by sexual violence.
In contrast, the judicial response to claims that sexual
assault law falls short of constitutional equality norms has
been mixed. There has, indeed, been some recognition of
the need for analysis of the co-existing constitutional rights
(including equality) of all persons whose status and
interests are affected by criminal trials. The following is a
frequently quoted example from the Supreme Court of
Canada:
It cannot be forgotten that a sexual assault is very different
from other assaults. It is true that it, like all the other
forms of assault, is an act of violence. Yet it is something
more than a simple act of violence. Sexual assault is in the
vast majority of cases gender based. It is an assault on
human dignity and constitutes a denial of any concept of
equality for women.'4
The Supreme Court has built in an equality analysis in
deciding whether other offenses meet constitutional
standards. A distinctive feature of the Charter, in
comparison to the United States, is section 1, which
guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in the Charter
13. An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (sexual assault), ch. 38, 1992 S.C.
991.
14. The Queen v. Osolin (1993) 26 C.R. (4th) 1, 23 (S.C.C.) [reporting decision
of the Supreme Court of Canada].
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"subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as
can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society." Equality, while not fully recognized as a
constitutional right, co-existing with freedom of expression,
was an aspect of section 1 analysis in challenges to the
obscenity and hate crimes offenses. Cases such as The
Queen v. Keegstra5 and The Queen v. Butler'6 demonstrate
some judicially recognized linkage between the status of
certain groups in society and the legitimacy of crimes
respectful of their interests. 7
On the other hand, a majority of the Supreme Court of
Canada has decided in a number of important cases, such
as those having to do with pre-trial production of the
personal records of complainants, not to consider equality
as a relevant constitutional value. 8
Thus, Canadian courts pay unreliable attention to the
equality implications of sexual assault law. This poses a
difficulty in suggesting how equality plays a role in model
offenses. Even with constitutional values, there are
15. [19901 3 S.C.R. 697 [Decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada]
(upholding the law criminalizing incitement to hatred against identifiable
groups).
16. [19921 1 S.C.R. 452 (upholding the law criminalizing obscenity).
17. A further example can be found in the fact that the Supreme Court has
used an equality analysis in developing the rules of evidence. In The Queen v.
Salituro [19911 3 S.C.R. 654, a spouse who would have been incompetent to testify
for the prosecution at common law was permitted to testify when the accused and
his wife were separated without any reasonable possibility of reconciliation. The
Court emphasized that the common law rule which excluded evidence against the
accused was inconsistent with equality rights. "The rule reflects a view of the
role of women which is no longer compatible with the importance now given to
sexual equality." Id. at 671.
18. For example, in The Queen v. O'Connor (1995) 44 C.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.1
the 5/4 majority, on this issue, characterized the issue of when accused persons
should have access to records in the hands of third parties as requiring a
balancing of the constitutional right to privacy on the one hand and to full answer
and defense on the other. The dissenting judges included the right to equality
without discrimination as an explicit part of their constitutional analysis, stating,
for example, that "[rioutine insistence on the exposure of complainants' personal
backgrounds has the potential to reflect a built-in bias in the criminal justice
system against those most vulnerable to repeat victimization." Id. at 59 (La
Forest, L'Heureux-Dub6, JJ, dissenting). But see The Queen v. Mills [1999] 3
S.C.R. 668 (adopting an equality analysis of this issue).
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varying political views, both about the question of whether
sexual assault is an equality issue and about the
implications of agreement on that point. My view is that
any law on sexual violence which was not grounded in an
understanding that sexual assault is the practice of
inequality and that any legal response to it needs to be
consistent with the right to equality as well as other
constitutional values would not be model. Not only does an
egalitarian law avoid the danger of the law condoning the
practice of targeting certain vulnerable groups for sexual
violence, attention to equality as well as other
constitutional values promotes the most valuable form of
consistency.
The problem of varying political views, even at the
level of relevant constitutional norms, is even more obvious
with respect to the choice of a general orientation to the use
of criminal law to further social policy. Such an orientation
inevitably underlies any codification. Views are expressed
in many different ways; for instance that the criminal law
should be used with restraint 19 and as a last resort, or
alternatively, that society should turn to it readily to
promote law and order. With respect to sexual violence,
there may be particular ideas, such as that it is pointless
and wrong to criminalize "natural," "trivial," or
commonplace behavior; that the criminal law cannot
diverge too significantly from general social norms, or even,
conceivably, that the criminal law should facilitate male
sexual access to women irrespective of their wishes,
perhaps associated with concerns about labeling men as
criminals on the word of women. Alternatively, some may
take the view that the criminal law has an important role
to play in labeling, deterring, and denouncing crimes of
privilege, such as crimes of sexual violence against
members of disadvantaged groups. On a more complex
level, some (and indeed some of the same people) may take
19. This is a frequent note in criminal law reform papers in Canada. See, e.g.,
Government of Canada, The Criminal Law in Canadian Society 59 (1982) (noting
that "the nature and extent of the response of the criminal justice system should
be governed by considerations of economy, necessity and restraint.").
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the view that a fundamental concern in framing sexual
offenses is to minimize, to the extent that this can be done,
the risk of the law being misused to oppress people of color.
Here Canadians working in this field have been very
interested in American analysis. For example, the work of
Kimberle Crenshaw has been influential. ° She has argued
that feminist theory (in this case about the criminal law of
rape) emanating from a white context obscures the
multidimensionality of black women's lives. To "criticize
rape law as reflecting male control over female sexuality is
for black women an oversimplified account."2' The
protection of white female sexuality was, for blacks, often
the pretext for racial terror, so that some may "fear that
anti-rape agendas may undermine anti-racist objectives.2
My own view is that criminal law, as the embodiment
of state power at its most brutal, should be used with
restraint. This view is reinforced by fear of the danger that
criminal law may be used in a discriminatory fashion
against particular stigmatized groups. At the same time, I
think that there should be some rough equity in the costs
and benefits of using criminal sanctions to further social
policy. Particular groups, such as women and children,
should only have to bear their fair share of any costs
flowing from either criminalization or non-criminalization.
There is no consensus on such views in Canada. Indeed,
there is what seems to be growing support for increasing,
and more punitive, use of criminal sanctions as part of
what might be called a "law and order" movement.
I cannot think of any process for rationally
determining what particular orientation would produce
"model" sexual offenses. It is impossible to escape some
choice of political orientation. Even if one, for example,
turned to "science" as a basis for modeling sexual offenses
20. See, e.g., Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race
and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist
Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. Chi. Legal F. 139, 157-60 (1989).
21. Id. at 157. However, I would argue that rape law is about women's
accessibility to men, and the gradations of accessibility among women.
22. Id. at 160.
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in terms of what is knowable about the efficacy of criminal
sanctions, that still involves a perspective about the
appropriate role of the criminal law, and thus what
standards to test it against. For instance, does it have any
symbolic, denunciatory role? Perhaps the only way in
which sexual offenses could be "model" is in the open
articulation of this choice of perspective.
I found it difficult to find much open articulation of a
general orientation to the use of criminal law in the M.P.C.
and its Commentaries. There does seem to be some
commitment to restraint or economy, illustrated positively
in the rejection of criminalizing sexual relations between
gay and lesbian people,O and negatively in the treatment of
some homosexual rapes as less serious than heterosexual
rapes.24 In my view, the proposals reflect a strong sense of
confidence in an intuitive ability to grade degrees of gravity
and to frame substantive standards for determining
culpability. However, such confidence is probably a
necessary part of actually making any concrete proposals
with respect to the use of the criminal law.
A specific aspect of the question of general orientation
is the question of legitimacy. A model code should reflect
some sense of its own claim to legitimacy since it has not
emerged from any democratic process. This is particularly
challenging with respect to crimes largely committed by
members of relatively privileged groups against members
of relatively disadvantaged groups, such as sexual violence.
Here there are likely to be differing orientations to the use
of criminal sanctions in general and to the detailed
formulation of offenses.
How does one capture a sufficient sense of public
support for behavioral norms reflected in a code, while also
acknowledging the harms (from both criminalization and
non-criminalization) experienced by groups lacking the
power to make their views of what needs to be criminalized
the dominant one? In Canada, I am concerned that, fuelled
23. See Model Penal Code § 213.2 cmt. at 357-76 (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1980).
24. See id. § 213.1 cmt. at 338.
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in part by a growing law and order perspective, it is
becoming increasingly easy politically to criminalize the
activities of members of such groups. To what standard
would one appeal for legitimacy in a context in which it
would be easier to prosecute women who complain to police
of sexual assault and who defend themselves from sexual
assault than to prosecute sexual assaulters?
Some attention to the problem of legitimacy in the
Commentaries to the M.P.C. can be found in the discussion
of the gradations of "consensual" intercourse with children:
Extension of penal sanctions to this case [of late
adolescence] raises all of the problems generally associated
with use of the criminal law to enforce a majoritarian norm,
that even on an abstract level, does not command the
uniform support of society and that in any event is often
belied by common social practice.2 5
Lack of consensus and the likely widespread
unenforceable criminalizing of commonplace behavior
create a danger of illegitimacy, both of "model" offenses and
the laws adopting them. The concept of legitimacy in itself,
however, has dominant forms. Offenses reflecting the
dominant absence of a norm, or of a norm tilted toward
dominant interests, will of course be illegitimate from
minority perspectives. Political processes deal with such
issues by counting heads (subject to constitutional
constraints), but should a model code, offering itself for
political adoption, anticipate the result of head counting, or
should it seek legitimacy at some more idealistic level?
It seems to me the legitimacy of a model penal code
process in itself needs more than a critical perspective on,
and clear articulation of, what it is relying on for its
appeal-whether consensus (we will only propose what no
one will object to), majority support (we will rock the boat
as little as possible), or protection of minority interests (we
will confront the neglect of, for instance, women who are at
distinctive risk of sexual violence and of being seen as
25. Id. cmt. at 328.
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distinctively lacking credibility).
However, at a minimum, there should be a clear
articulation of what framers of a model code are appealing
to for legitimacy. To what does the M.P.C. appeal? There
are a number of clues in the Commentaries. First, the
clearest articulation can be found in the discussion of
whether consensual homosexual relations should be
criminal. The criminal law should focus on the most
serious harms for reasons of economy and practical limits
on enforcement. Some offenses would create a risk of
arbitrary enforcement, thus raising concerns about
"fairness and horizontal equity."26  Second, in the
discussion of reform in different states, facile appeals for
popularity are rejected, in favor of "balance":
It is, after all, both politically rewarding and relatively easy
to take a public stand by passing a law against plainly
offensive and unpopular conduct. Although the point is
valid with respect to any crime, it deserves special emphasis
here that definition of the crime of rape calls for a balanced
judgment on the many difficult issues that must be
resolved.
I find this an interesting comment, following as it does
a discussion of "current perceptions of rape," which reflects
significant attention to feminist concerns. One could be
forgiven for reaching the conclusion that feminist concerns
are dominant and a measure of what would be popular,
rather than a minority critique. One way of seeking
legitimacy while not addressing the problem of crimes
against distinctively victimized and marginalized groups in
society would be to aim to satisfy dominant concerns while
adopting a posture of embattled and principled constraint.
Of course, any legitimate model offenses should be
balanced, but a claim to balance should not mask a political
perspective antagonistic to the equality interests of
vulnerable groups. A second clue to the nature of the claim
26. Id. § 213.2 cmt. at 371.
27. Id. § 213.1 cmt. at 286.
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to legitimacy can be found in the discussion of the Michigan
reforms, which are criticized as over-broad, as carelessly
drafted, and as criminalizing trivial and innocent
behavior.2 Furthermore, there are instances where the
Michigan law is bizarre, and plainly unacceptable. Thus:
The statute also adopts what seems plainly an unacceptable
standard to authorize up to a 15-year sentence for the
offense of sexual contact. The definition of "sexual contact"
includes any touching of the victim's or the actor's intimate
parts or the clothing covering the immediate area "if that
intentional touching can reasonably be construed as being
for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification."29
The Michigan law in this respect bears some
resemblance to the Canadian law of sexual assault, the
lowest level of which is punishable by a maximum ten year
sentence. The "sexual" element is determined by an
objective standard, albeit one in which the intent of the
assaulter may be a factor. A "sexual" and thus, a more
serious, assault is one committed in circumstances of a
sexual nature, such that the sexual integrity of the victim
is violated.80
Some unexpressed standard of legitimacy is being used
to reject as plainly unacceptable a serious sentence for
sexual touching. Any non-consensual touching can be
reasonably seen as a serious interference with bodily
integrity. It is inconsistent with respect for sexual
autonomy and in this context, where specific groups in
society are distinctively targeted for sexual use irrespective
of their wishes, inconsistent with equality. The common
law has traditionally seen the touching of men as non-
trivial. Thus in The Queen v. Ewanchuk it was stated:
Having control over who touches one's body, and how, lies at
the core of human dignity and autonomy. The inclusion of
assault and sexual assault in the Code expresses society's
28. See id. cmt. at 295.
29. Id. cmt. at 298.
30. See The Queen v. Chase [19871 2 S.C.R.293.
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determination to protect the security of the person from any
non-consensual contact or threats of force. The common law
has recognized for centuries that the individual's right to
physical integrity is a fundamental principle, "every man's
person being sacred, and no other having the right to
meddle with it in any the slightest manner."31
The view that any non-consensual sexual touching can
be seen as serious is an acceptable one if only on the
ground that when someone touches a person irrespective of
their wishes, there is no way of knowing when the invasion
of bodily integrity will stop short of death. A woman who
has faced death but been fortunate enough only to be
grabbed by the breasts may not, in hindsight, share the
view that treating her experience as a serious offense is
somehow illegitimate.
Further, she might also take the view that the law
should be indifferent as to whether the grabbing was for
sexual arousal or reasonably construed as sexual. Should
it make any difference if it were reasonably construed as
for the purpose of humiliation? It would be consistent with
the M.P.C.'s position on objective manifestation of
aggression to support the removal of such a standard as
irrationally benefiting accused persons.
Here my concern is not so much that there are
differences of opinion about the appropriate reach of the
law and how it should be expressed, but that there are
standards of legitimacy at work here which need to be
much more fully developed for a new model code. For
instance, the problem is that the framers of, and
commentators on, the M.P.C. see some forms of non-
consensual sexual contact as trivial. Many people may well
agree. Others, such as myself, may not. But I find it
challenging to find reasons to label proposals based on my
views as model.
There are jurisprudential suggestions as to what to do
for the best in a situation of conflict. An approach that is
grounded in equality is "looking to the bottom" as
31. (1999) 22 C.R. (5th) 1, 17 (S.C.C.) (citations omitted).
500
"MODEL" SEXUAL OFFENSES
suggested by Mari J. Matsuda.$2 Ann Scales describes this
approach as including the rejection of epistemological
privilege:
When the law must chose between realities, the principle of
equality requires that we look to see whose dignity is most
at stake, whose point of view has historically been silenced
and is in danger of being silenced again, and that, in the
ordinary case, we chose that point of view as our
interpretation."8
Thus, for those prepared to give up epistemological
privilege, we can say what the (model) answer is in any
given case, at least the best answer for the moment.
However, theory is perhaps the most contested ground of
all. It seems unlikely that the framers of a new model code
could agree on a legitimacy-conferring theory on which to
ground their work.
Is it possible to turn to process to find some degree of
legitimacy then, to get beyond the minimum of articulation
of standards of legitimacy? In my view, some degree of
legitimacy can be found in an inclusive process. An
example can be found in the process which produced "An
Act to amend the Criminal Code (sexual assault). 34 This
process was remarkable for the consultations by the
Ministry of Justice with women's groups, such as the
Women's Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF), the
National Association of Women and the Law (NAWL), the
National Association of Immigrant and Visible Minority
Women (NOIVM), the Canadian Association of Sexual
Assault Centres (CASAC), and the Native Women's
Association of Canada (NWAC). Thus the Department of
Justice had the benefit of the advice of activists, front-line
workers, and individuals knowledgeable about the reality
of, and legal practices surrounding, sexual assault. It has
32. Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and
Reparations, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 323, 324 (1987).
33. Ann Scales, Feminist Legal Method: Not So Scary, 2 UCLA Women's L.J.
1, 27 (1992).
34. Ch. 38, 1992 S.C. 991 (Can.).
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been described by one of the participants, Sheila McIntyre,
as translating principles of "accountability to, inclusion of,
and genuine power sharing among the broad women's
community into feminist legal practice."35 I think it is also
fair to say that this process was somewhat successful in
developing legal doctrines responsive to diverse social
realities.
For example, it was these consultations which laid the
foundation for the new Canadian provision that, while
hardly surprising to observers in the United States, an
honest mistake as to consent is not a defense where "the
accused did not take reasonable steps, in the circumstances
known to the accused at the time, to ascertain that the
accused was consenting." 6 Further, the consultations were
also helpful in focusing at least some attention on layers of
disadvantage among women. Thus a provision dealing
with consent, that it is not obtained where "the agreement
is expressed by the words or conduct of a person other than
the complainant,"3 7 addresses a concern that some
sponsored immigrant women are vulnerable to having
consent expressed by others on their behalf.
I would argue that an inclusive consultation process is
vital to the legitimacy of any new model penal code.
Against this background-albeit a rather inconclusive
one with respect to what makes "model" sexual offenses-I
now go on to address a range of issues arising out of a
Canadian reading section 213 of the M.P.C. Significant
differences can be seen between provisions of the M.P.C.
and current Canadian law. In considering these
differences I ask what attention to constitutional equality
norms could bring to the framing of sexual offenses. Given
my tentativeness in identifying other standards against
which to test any claim to legitimacy of "model" approaches
35. See Sheila McIntyre, Redefining Reformism: The Consultations That
Shaped Bill C-49, in Julian V. Roberts & Renate M. Mohr, Confronting Sexual
Assault: A Decade of Legal and Social Change 293, 294 (1994).
36. An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (sexual assault), ch. 38, 1992 S.C. §
273.2(b) (Can.).
37. Id. §. 273.1(2)(a).
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to these issues, I fall back on attention to constitutional
norms as the guide about which I can be most confident.
1. SHOULD "MODEL" OFFENSES BE NEUTRAL?
Section 213.1 of the M.P.C. is sex-specific,
criminalizing only male sexual violence, in the form of
"rape" and "gross sexual imposition," against women other
than wives. On their face, these offenses are race-neutral.
Other offenses, such as "deviate sexual intercourse" in
seetion 213.2 are neutral. Since the early eighties,
Canadian "sexual assault" offenses have been neutral.
Does neutral drafting contribute to "model" sexual
offenses?
In this particular context, this issue overlaps with the
question of the legal significance, if any, to be attached to
penetration, but it can be discussed on a broader level,
having to do with codification and law reform in general.
This paper begins with the obvious point that model
offenses must be constitutional, and, with respect to the
constitutions of both the United States and Canada, this
includes egalitarian. From a Canadian perspective, the
United States' interpretation of equality offers little
guidance on how to model sexual offenses in terms of
neutrality.8 In general it would appear that the similarly
situated approach points toward the neutral drafting of
offenses to apply to everyone who can be harmed in similar
ways. However, with respect to sexual offenses, it could be
argued that men and women (and certainly adults and
children) are not the same and therefore do not have to be
treated the same way in law. It is difficult for arguments
about whether difference, or indeed sameness, contribute to
the social subordination of disadvantaged groups to gain a
foothold. 9
88. Laurence Tribe notes that equality "can be denied when government
classifies so as to distinguish... between persons who should be regarded as
similarly situated in terms of the relevant equal protection principles." Laurence
H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1438 (2d ed. 1988).
39. For a short description of Canadian equality jurisprudence, with its
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The question of whether offenses should be neutralized
to become more "model" is a complex one, as recognized in
the Commentaries. 40 There are significant arguments for
sex-specificity in the drafting of offenses governing quite
sex-specific behavior. The sex-specific offenses in the
M.P.C. could be seen as a traditional recognition of the
biological differences between men and women associated
with male fears of the penetration of their women by other
men.41  As well, they could be seen as a progressive
recognition of the distinctively gendered harm of rape and
its social significance in terms of its role in the social
subordination of women. Specificity avoids the problem of
neutrality-that of masking and facilitating dominant
interpretations. One well-known Canadian example is that
of the court which held that touching a woman's breast
could not be sexual assault, as that would mean touching
other secondary sexual characteristics, such as a man's
beard, would be too.42 Thus a new code might well continue
to model the recognition of gendered harms (and indeed
begin to model the harms of racialization, for example in
the form of hate crimes) as well as gendered
justifications/excuses.
There are of course also significant arguments in favor
of neutral drafting. Sex is an increasingly inefficient proxy
for more functional forms of classification. Even if one
accepts that women are a political group-albeit highly
diverse, but having sexual subordination in common at
some level-male and female as categories are bound to be
somewhat fuzzy as well as both over and under inclusive.
Neutrality diminishes the need to capture shifting social
realities in a single legislative moment-to predict all the
relative focus on disadvantage, see Robert J. Sharpe & Katherine Swinton, The
Charter of Rights and Freedoms ch. 15 (1998).
40. See Model Penal Code § 213.1 cmt. at 334-39 (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1980).
41. This view seems supported by the marital immunity and the lesser
protection offered "voluntary social companions."
42. See The Queen v. Chase (1984) 13 C.C.C. (3d) 187 [Canadian Criminal
Cases] (N.B.C.A.) [New Brunswick Court of Appeal], rev'd, 37 C.C.C. (3d) 97
(S.C.C.).
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ways in which rape-like sexual violence can be used as
reminders to certain groups that they are there for sexual
use by others.
The approach that I would see as model is to ensure
that as many social realities are understood before
drafting, through an inclusive consultation process, and
then to draft neutral offenses. In other words, attention to
equality, in the sense that the interests of certain types of
victim are not marginalized and ignored, and a claim to
legitimacy can be found in the process of becoming
informed about diverse social contexts, rather than in
drafting'offenses to apply in sex-specific ways. However,
given that there are serious arguments for and against
both neutrality and specificity, I doubt that one approach
can be seen as more "model" than the others.
2. SHOULD THERE BE ANY SORT OF RELATIONSHIP
IMMUNITY?
Section 213.1 of the M.P.C. confers immunity from
criminal responsibility on husbands who rape their wives
(or commit the offense of gross sexual imposition), unless
there is a decree of judicial separation. Indeed theimmunity extends to those men who live with a woman "as
man and wife, regardless of the legal status of their
relationship."4 As well, it uses the relationship between
the offender and the victim to grade offenses. Thus, rape is
a felony in the second degree if the victim was a "voluntary
social companion of the actor upon the occasion of the
crime" or had "previously permitted him sexual liberties."44
Pure stranger rape is therefore seen as more serious, a
felony of the first degree.
Canada removed husbands' immunity in the early
eighties 4 and never had any sort of substantive rule that it
was less serious to rape one's friends, companions, lovers,
or ex-lovers. Such ideas may of course have influenced
43. Model Penal Code § 213.6(2) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980).
44. Id.
45. See supra note 3.
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reporting, prosecutorial discretion, and sentencing. As
well, we do have a continuing debate about an evidentiary
form of such immunities or partial immunities.46
Is it possible to find a model approach to the protection
of wives, lovers, friends, etc., from sexual violence? This
issue relates to the sexual autonomy and sexual
accessibility of women in relationships, and thus it may be
useful to turn to a norm of equality for guidance. Women
who are in, or have been in (given the term "previously" in
the M.P.C.), relationships with men, are vulnerable to
being seen as distinctively sexually accessible, and
therefore, to being denied the full protection and benefit of
the law. If either the substantive or the evidentiary law
attaches significance to the relationship, then the law is in
danger of promoting the creation of categories of women to
whom some men have privileged access, irrespective of the
wishes of the women themselves.
3. WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE SCOPE OF CRIMINALIZED
BEHAVIOR?
Sexual violence raises many issues requiring the
setting of boundaries on the scope of criminalized behavior.
Two sample issues will be mentioned here.
First, to what extent and at what level should non-
violent, non-consensual sexual contact be criminalized?
Given the ongoing difficulties with the meaning of consent,
the M.P.C. attempts to minimize, with respect to rape, the
difficulties of consent as a boundary by focusing largely on
the behavior of the accused. Thus the offense of rape
criminalizes various forms of compulsion to submit, and the
impairment of capacity. As well, sexual intercourse with
unconscious women and children under ten is included.
Attention to the behavior of the complainant is not
completely avoided, however, since the offense of gross
sexual imposition criminalizes compulsion by threats "that
46. See, e.g., Boyle & MacCrimmon, supra note 11, at 219-37.
47. See generally Christine Boyle, Sexual Assault in Abusive Relationships:
Common Sense about Sexual History, 19 Dalhousie L.J. 223 (1996).
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would prevent resistance by a woman of ordinary
resolution."48
This structure creates the possibility that non-forceful,
yet non-consensual sexual contact is not included. This
could occur in two ways. First, there may be non-
consensual contact in the absence of anything that could
qualify as coercion.49 Second, the interpretation of both
"threats" and the "ordinary resolution" standard, could
have the same effect. Consider, for example, the scenario
where the accused said "I won't hurt you." What to me
seems very frightening could be seen as not a threat and if
it were a threat, then resistible by a woman of ordinary
resolution. There is, of course, the possibility of conviction,
under section 213.4, of sexual assault. This would make
the "knowingly offensive sexual contact with another" a
misdemeanor. This criminalizes sexual touching in a fairly
weak manner, since the pivotal concept is knowledge of
offensiveness. Thus, it seems to suggest a form of
rebuttable touchableness, that people can be touched until
they make the offensiveness of the touching known.
In Canada, it is becoming increasingly clear that non-
forceful, non-consensual sexual contact is criminal, and
that the default position is non-consent. It is an offense to
touch another person sexually without that person's
consent. ° Consent means "the voluntary agreement of the
complainant to engage in the sexual activity in question."5'
Further, no "consent is obtained... where.., the
complainant expresses, by words or conduct, a lack of
agreement to engage in the activity."52 Thus, colloquially,
"no means no." Further, the Supreme Court of Canada has
48. Model Penal Code § 213.1(2)(a) (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1980).
49. This could be accompanied, plausibly, by lack of knowledge of
offensiveness and thus not be caught by the sexual assault offense in section
213.4.
50. See An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (sexual assault), ch. 38, 1992
S.C. §§ 271 (sexual assault), 272 (sexual assault with a weapon, threats to a third
party or causing bodily harm), 273 (aggravated sexual assault) (Can.).
51. Id. § 273.1(1).
52. Id. § 273.1(2)(d).
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held, albeit in a very brief judgement, that passivity is not
consent. Thus, in The Queen v. M.(M.L.), 3 the Supreme
Court of Canada said that in the circumstances of that
case, the court below "was in error in holding that a victim
is required to offer some minimal word or gesture of
objection and that lack of resistance must be equated with
consent."54 The most recent decision of the Court can be
found in The Queen v. Ewanchuk5 In this case, the
majority of the Court referred to the touching of the passive
person in its analysis of mens rea, stating that "a belief
that silence, passivity or ambiguous conduct constitutes
consent is a mistake of law, and provides no defense."56
So, how should model offenses criminalize non-forceful,
non-consensual sexual contact? To criminalize it in a way
that does not turn on the perspective of the accused
requires a focus on the concept of consent. The issue can be
illustrated by positing a trial in which the Crown has
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant
was passive, she said neither yes nor no to sexual
intercourse or any other form of sexual contact. Has the
Crown proved non-consent? I would suggest that in
Canada, the answer is yes but that under the M.P.C., the
answer would be no, or at best, the accused would have
committed a misdemeanor where there were some other
facts suggesting knowledge of offensiveness.
Again, here it would be useful to turn to the norm of
equality for guidance. It seems to me that being treated by
the law as if you are in a perpetual state of willingness to
have sexual contact which has to be withdrawn by
something that will make the offensiveness known to make
you entitled to sexual autonomy is a signal of very low
status in any society. As well, any legal rule which
requires resistance or any form of negative reaction to
trigger the right to sexual autonomy seems to signal that
the safety of the target group is not a high priority. Thus,
53. (1994) 30 C.R. (4th) 153 (S.C.C.).
54. Id. at 155.
55. (1999) 22 C.R. (5th) 1 (S.C.C.).
56. Id. at 23 (citation omitted).
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in my view, it would be consistent with the equality rights
of the primary targets of sexual assault, women and
children, to place the risk of non-consent on persons
wishing to have sexual contact with others.
Second, to what extent should fraudulent sexual
contact be criminalized? The M.P.C. does propose the
criminalization of some, narrow forms of fraudulent sexual
assault. Section 213.1(2)(c) includes as gross sexual
imposition the situation where the accused "knows that she
is unaware that a sexual act is being committed upon her
or that she submits because she mistakenly supposes that
he is her husband."57  This is a felony in the third degree
because "there is no prospect of physical danger."58 Several
concerns can be raised about this. To me, it is intuitively
wrong to treat fraudulent rape as less serious. I doubt that
I would say of a friend going for a medical examination that
if she were in danger of being sexually assaulted in some
fraudulent manner that she was in no physical danger. One
would not normally say that because a person was not the
victim of two offenses-sexual assault and assault causing
bodily injury-that the former form of assault did not put
them in physical danger. Second, the narrow definition
offers hardly any realistic protection from fraudulent
sexual assault to women. Patricia J. Falk, in her article,
Rape by Fraud and Rape by Coercion,19 offers many
examples of "commercial-like fraud (i.e. sexual scams),"60
and "property-like offenses (i.e. sexual theft and
extortion)," 1 which I think a rational codifier would include
in a new model code as being as serious as other forms of
sexual assault as well as other financial offenses.
The Canadian Criminal Code does not take a position
on the scope of this type of sexual assault, referring only to
fraud in stating that "no consent is obtained where the
57. See Model Penal Code § 213.1(2)(c) (Official Drai and Revised Comments
1980); see also id. § 213.3 (seduction under false promise of marriage).
58. Id. § 213.1 cmt. at 331.
59. 64 Brook. L. Rev. 39 (1998).
60. Id. at 50.
61. Id.
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complainant submits or does not resist by reason of... (c)
fraud."6 2 The Supreme Court of Canada has recently taken
a much more expansive view of the meaning of fraud in The
Queen v. Cuerrier,13 a case dealing with an accused who
had unprotected sex with two complainants without telling
them that he was HIV positive and who was charged with
aggravated assault.
In Cuerrier, the Court revisited the old English case of
The Queen v. Clarence," in which it was held that a
husband's failure to tell his wife that he had gonorrhea did
not vitiate her consent to sexual intercourse. This case had
been approved in Bolduc v. The Queen,65 in which it was
held that the complainant consented to a medical
examination attended by a voyeur she had been told was
an intern. A broader view of fraud was adopted for cases
where there is a significant risk of bodily harm:
[it is no longer necessary when examining whether consent
in assault or sexual assault cases was vitiated by fraud
related to consider whether the fraud related to the nature
and quality of the act. A principled approach consistent with
the plain language of the section and an appropriate
approach to consent in sexual assault matters is preferable.
To that end, I see no reason why... the principles which
have historically been applied in relation to fraud in
criminal law cannot be used.66
Thus, "it should now be taken that for the accused to
conceal or fail to disclose that he is HIV-positive can
constitute fraud which may vitiate consent to sexual
intercourse."67
The majority here appeals for legitimacy to principle
and appropriateness. However, in my view, the appeal is to
62. An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (sexual assault), ch. 38, 1992 S.C. S.
265(3) (Can.).
63. (1998) 18 C.R. (5th) 1 (S.C.C.).
64. (1888) 22 Q.B.D. 23 (England: Queen's Bench Div.).
65. [1967] S.C.R. 677.
66. Cuerrier [1998] C.R. (5th) at 47.
67. Id. at 50.
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prompt complaint is not rationally linked to a lack of
credibility. As well, to Canadian eyes, with increasing
experience of the prosecution of "historical" sexual assault
cases, limitation periods on serious criminal offenses look
very unusual, in spite of concerns about the prosecution of
stale cases. There are no limitations on the prosecution of
sexual assault as an indictable offense, the Canadian
equivalent of a felony. Indeed, limitation periods have
given rise to constitutional challenges in the civil context.v6
3. Lastly, the M.P.C. has a strong corroboration rule,
in that corroboration is required for conviction of a felony.
As well, there must be a warning to the jury to evaluate the
testimony of a complainant "with special care in view of the
emotional involvement of the witness and the difficulty of
determining the truth with respect to alleged sexual
activities carried out in private."77  The Commentaries,
however, raise concerns about this, pointing out that this is
an area of "special sensitivity."78
Canada has neither corroboration rule, although there
used to be a requirement of a warning. Section 274 states:
Where an accused is charged with [sexual assault] no
corroboration is required for a conviction and a judge shall
not instruct a jury that it is unsafe to find the accused guilty
in the absence of corroboration.79
Evidentiary rules (or in this case their substantive
equivalents) trigger what is possibly the clearest
illustration of the importance of the modeling of egalitarian
sexual offenses. It is here where signals of low social
status, in the undervaluing of the sexual autonomy of
275 (Can.). However, it is still possible for the Crown to lead evidence of the
complainant's prompt complaint, in response, for instance, to a defense allegation
of recent fabrication.
76. See KM. v. H.M., [1992] 3 S.C.R. 6.
77. Model Penal Code § 213.6(5) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980).
78. Id. cmt. at 422; see also id. cmt. at 425 (discussing criticisms of the New
York law as reflecting an "official policy of suspicion.").
79. An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (sexual assault), ch. 38, 1992 S.C. §
2000] 513
514 BUFFALO CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:487
sexually active women and women in relationships, as well
as in the assumption of a distinctive lack of credibility, can
be most easily found.
Thus, I would argue that fine-tuning the substantive
protection of the law to the sexual history of the
complainant is not consistent with equality. In Canada,
where the weaker evidentiary version of the sexual history
rule is somewhat controversial, there still seems general
agreement that it is illegitimate to reason directly from a
complainant's sexual experience to consent or lack of
credibility. Further, rules which signal a particular
skepticism of the groups primarily targeted for sexual
assault, here women and children, that limit the protection
of the law to people who complain quickly and can be
corroborated, are subject to criticism as inegalitarian.
CONCLUSION
In my view, the challenge of justifting standards
against which draft sexual offenses can be tested to see if
they can be held up as models is a difficult one. Discussed
above are some weak standards which seem unlikely to be
controversial-the articulation of a general orientation and
both conscious and critical attention to the problem of
legitimacy. It may be that an inclusive consultation
process would fall into that category too. However, any
actual standard of legitimacy, such as "looking to the
bottom" is likely to give rise to debates similar to ones
about actual competing draft offenses. However, although
the very meaning of equality and its applicability as a
standard against which to test sexual offenses may be
similarly debatable, in my view it is a crucial standard
against which to test the "modelness"of the sexual offenses
in any new model penal code.
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a more egalitarian valuing of physical and financial
security. One member of the Court, Madame Justice
LHIeureux-Dub6, would have held that fraud was any
dishonesty which induced another to consent to an act,
whether or not that act was dangerous.6 In my view, this
goes further in the direction of equality in terms of valuing
both sexual and financial autonomy. People should be able
to make decisions about what to do with both their bodies
and their money uninfluenced by fraudulent factors, if they
would have made different decisions had they known the
truth.
4. WHAT ARE APPROPRIATE CONTROLS OF THE FACT
DETERMINATION PROCESS?
The M.P.C. does not generally purport to regulate the
fact determination process, but nevertheless, some
provisions with links to evidentiary rules are included with
respect to sexual offenses. There are three types of
evidentiary rules which have attracted much analysis and
criticism in the common law world: those relating to
corroboration, what would be called recent complaint in
Canada, and sexual history. The M.P.C. contains very
strong, that is, pro-accused, versions of these rules. Here
again it may be possible to turn to equality as a standard
for model offenses.
1. Section 213.6(3) of the M.P.C. contains a
substantive version of a sexual history rule in that it is a
defense to certain offenses to prove that the complainant
had "engaged promiscuously in sexual relations with
others."0 Thus, a prison guard charged with having sexual
intercourse with a person in custody would be acquitted on
proving the complainant promiscuous. 70  (It should be
noted, however, that this defense does not apply to rape or
gross sexual imposition.). So while bad girls can't be
coerced into sex, they lack protection from the use of power
68. Id. at 15-24 (L Heureux-Dub4, J., dissenting).
69. Model Penal Code § 213.6(3) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980).
70. See id. § 213.3(lXc).
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or authority. More broadly, the fact that the complainant
had previously permitted the accused sexual liberties
would reduce rape to a felony in the second degree.71 The
marital immunity is an even stronger substantive rule
taking sexual history into account.
In contrast, Canada sets some limitations on the use of
sexual history evidence, including sexual history with the
accused. Section 276(1) of the Criminal Code states:
In [sexual assault] proceedings ... evidence that the
complainant has engaged in sexual activity, whether with
the accused or any other person, is not admissible to
support an inference that, by reason of the sexual nature of
that activity, the complainant
is more likely to have consented...; or is less worthy of
belief.72
2. Section 213.6(4) of the M.P.C. contains an
extremely strong, substantive version of the recent
complaint rule (a weak evidentiary version being that the
lack of a prompt complaint may undermine credibility in
the absence of explanation).73  It basically suggests a
limitation period of three months for sexual offenses.7 4
In Canada, the recent complaint rule has been
"abrogated,"75 given the recognition that the lack of a
71. See id. § 213.1(1).
72. The constitutionality of Canadian sexual history rules are presently being
challenged before the Supreme Court of Canada in The Queen v. Darrach, [1998]
S.C.C.A. No. 184 (Q.L.), after being upheld by the Ontario Court of Appeal (1998)
122 C.C.C. (3d) 225.
73. See Model Penal Code. § 213.6(4) (prompt complaint) (Official Draft and
Revised Comments 1980).
74. See id.:
[n]o prosecution may be instituted or maintained under this Article unless
the alleged offense was brought to the notice of public authority within [3]
months of its occurrence or, where the alleged victim was less than [16]
years old or otherwise incompetent to make complaint, within [3] months
after a parent, guardian, or other competent person specially interested in
the victim learns of the offense.
75. An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (sexual assault), ch. 38, 1992 S.C. §
